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Essay 
AGENCY THREATS 
TIM WU† 
INTRODUCTION 
There are three main ways in which agencies regulate: 
rulemaking; adjudication; and informal tools of guidance, also called 
nonlegislative or interpretative rules.1 Over the last two decades, 
agencies have increasingly favored the use of the last of these three, 
which can include statements of best practices, interpretative guides, 
private warning letters, and press releases.2 
Scholars are hardly unaware of this trend. In a series of papers, 
writers have explored the use of informal regulation as it affects the 
relationship between agencies and the federal courts, asking when 
nonlegislative rules can be challenged as unenforceable for want of 
process.3 This Essay concerns a different question, centered on the 
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 1. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–554 (2006). 
 2. The turn to informal methods has been well documented. See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1393 (1992) 
(noting the “increasing tendency of agencies to engage in ‘nonrule rulemaking’ through 
relatively less formal devices such as policy statements, interpretative rules, manuals, and other 
informal devices”); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 295 (2006) (providing 
quantitative evidence of a rise in the use of “best practices” as a means of informal regulation). 
 3. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the 
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 279–80 (2010) (defending judicial refusal to follow scholars’ 
suggestions about how to distinguish between legislative and nonlegislative rules); Jacob E. 
Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1719 (2007) (“Rather than asking 
whether a rule is legislative to answer whether notice and comment procedures should have 
been used, courts should simply ask whether notice and comment procedures were used. If they 
were, the rule should be deemed legislative and binding if otherwise lawful. If they were not, the 
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relationship between the agency and the regulated industry: when 
might the use of such informal tools, in the form of “regulatory 
threats,” be desirable? 
Most legal writers are implicitly or explicitly critical of the use of 
threats as an alternative to rulemaking or adjudication. The general 
presumption is that the use of threats is a kind of symptom of an 
underlying malady—a broken rulemaking or adjudication process. 
For example, Professor Lars Noah describes the use of threats as an 
“intractable problem,” given the difficulty of “controlling the exercise 
of such wide-ranging discretionary power.”4 In this brief Essay, I write 
in defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts. 
The use of threats instead of law can be a useful choice—not 
simply a procedural end run. My argument is that the merits of any 
regulative modality cannot be determined without reference to the 
state of the industry being regulated. Threat regimes, I suggest, are 
important and are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid 
change—under conditions of “high uncertainty.” Highly informal 
regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in 
an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. 
Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology 
or business model, or a practice about which little is known. 
Conversely, in mature, settled industries, use of informal procedures 
is much harder to justify. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, absent the threat mechanism, 
the agency would have two options: to make law—through a 
rulemaking or adjudication—or to ignore the area altogether. Neither 
is particularly satisfying. The former forces the agencies to make law 
likely to last a long time based on poorly developed facts, and it 
invites long periods of uncertainty created by the judicial review 
process. The latter surrenders any public oversight or input during 
what may be a critical period of industry development. 
 
 
rule is nonlegislative.”); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 928 
(2004) (suggesting possible alternatives to the prevailing judicial approach to distinguishing 
between legislative and nonlegislative rules); Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the 
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 
850 (2001) (cautioning against a judicial approach that encourages agencies to promulgate 
informal rules and then to accompany them with the caveat that those rules are not binding). 
 4. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of 
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 874. 
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Ironically, whereas the procedures designated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)5 are primarily meant to protect 
the regulated industry, both industry and agency may sometimes 
prefer unenforceable rules and a lack of judicial involvement. Both 
agency and industry will sometimes share an interest in an informal 
and flexible regime that resembles an unenforceable “letter of intent” 
in the world of private contracts. The costs of a slow-moving, ossified 
rulemaking or adjudicatory procedure, with its accompanying 
uncertainty and litigation costs, fall on both industry and agency.6 
Meanwhile, the argument that rule by threat is a means of 
avoiding judicial review may be overstated. Threats are, by their 
nature, just that: threats to enforce or enact a rule, not binding actions 
in the usual sense of that word. Regulated entities that are unhappy 
with a de facto regime can and do test the threats, forcing the agency 
to use its more formal powers and therefore invoke judicial review. 
Similarly, when the industry refuses to comply with agency 
commands, or when the agency is unhappy with self-regulation, it 
must turn to formal action. As I argue, this fact serves as an important 
check on agency power. 
It is important to encourage the responsible use of agency threats 
and to try to develop a sense of the difference between the proper use 
of threats and their abuse, a project for which the last Part of this 
Essay offers some potential guidelines. Borrowing from the critics of 
threats, I develop a list of domains in which the use of threats is 
presumptively abusive and ought to be avoided. Some examples 
include using threats to avoid explicit congressional limits on power, 
and instances in which the need for very specific guidance is 
important. By contrast, in rapidly developing industries in which 
rulemaking is impracticable, highly informal methods are justified. 
I.  THREATS AND WHAT SCHOLARS THINK OF THEM 
The regulatory threats that I am interested in encompass a wide 
variety of informal agency activity, similar but not identical to the 
 
 5. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006). 
 6. Ossification in this context refers to a grand slowdown in the process of issuing rules. 
See McGarity, supra note 2, at 1387–96 (providing a particularly vivid picture of agency 
ossification). 
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statutory category of “interpretative rules.”7 These activities can 
include warning letters, official speeches, interpretations, and private 
meetings with regulated parties. As such, the threats I am describing 
are in the category of “soft law”—that is, law issued without the 
formalities that would make it binding.8 To be sure, there are 
differences among the many forms of informal action, but in this 
Essay I will focus on what makes them similar. 
One distinction is important: to be a regulatory threat, in the 
sense that I mean, it is essential that the action not simply express 
opinions or report on an issue. Rather, the action must give at least 
some warning of agency action related to either ongoing or planned 
behavior. That distinction leaves out mere policy guidelines, studies, 
reports, and similar materials, which can be important documents but 
are not the subject of this Essay. The reason I narrow the category to 
threats instead of interpretative rules generally is to examine the 
agency action most likely to directly influence behavior. In that sense, 
the comparison between threats and rulemaking or adjudication 
regimes is a comparison between different types of agency action that 
share the direct goal of specifying desired behavior. 
Agency threats, as I have described them, come in two major 
forms. The first is a private threat, of which a warning letter sent to a 
company is the paradigmatic example. The other is a public threat, 
such as a public speech given by an agency chair, describing what the 
agency believes to be unacceptable behavior, coupled with an explicit 
or implicit threat of either new rulemaking or enforcement of an 
existing rule. Some examples may help clarify each of these 
categories. 
In 2004, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman 
Michael Powell delivered a speech at a well-known 
telecommunications conference in Boulder, Colorado.9 During the 
speech, after various preliminary comments, he delivered a series of 
warnings to broadband providers in the cable and telephone 
 
 7. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (providing that the notice-and-comment requirement does 
not apply to “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice”). 
 8. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573, 579 (2008). 
 9. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles 
for the Industry, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on “The Digital Broadband 
Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age” (Feb. 8, 2004), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf. 
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industries. In particular, Powell instructed the industry to respect four 
“Internet Freedoms” of every Internet user, including the rights to 
reach applications of their choice and to attach devices of their 
choosing, like then-new home Wi-Fi devices.10 Soon after, the FCC 
brought an enforcement action against a small telephone company 
that was blocking an Internet application that allowed users to make 
inexpensive telephone calls.11 Powell’s speech, with its threats and 
subsequent enforcement action, is an example of the kind of public 
threat that is the primary interest of this Essay. 
In 2009, the Consumer Protection Bureau of the Federal Trade 
Commission issued a secret letter to various retailers and 
manufacturers of new “bamboo clothing.”12 The Commission believed 
that the material sold as bamboo fiber was in fact man-made rayon 
fabric, not “natural” or “environmentally friendly” as its 
manufacturers claimed. The warning letter in question is an example 
of a private threat, which led, in that case, to formal enforcement 
against various manufacturers.13 
*         *         * 
Administrative law scholars have spent considerable time 
thinking about the informal agency actions that are the subject of this 
Essay. These writers—incidentally, all former clerks of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals14—have a natural interest in how the use of 
informal methods affects the relationship between agencies and the 
federal courts.15 Stated more formally, they are interested in the legal 
status of what they call “nonlegislative rules,” a phrase that includes 
the agency threats discussed here. For these writers, the central 
 
 10. See id. at 5 (advocating the importance of customers having “access to their choice of 
legal content” and the ability to “run applications of their choice”). 
 11. See Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4297 & n.3 (2005) (“On 
February 11, 2005, the Bureau issued a Letter of Inquiry . . . to Madison River, initiating an 
investigation.”). 
 12. See FCC, COMPANIES RECEIVING LETTERS FROM FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
CONCERNING LABELING AND ADVERTISING OF “BAMBOO” TEXTILES (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/02/100203company-letter-recipients.pdf (providing a list of the 
recipients of the letter). 
 13. See, e.g., Pure Bamboo, LLC, File No. 0823193 (F.T.C. Aug. 11, 2009), available  
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823193/090811purebambooagree.pdf (detailing suspected 
violations and the agreement containing a consent order). 
 14. David Franklin, Jacob Gersen, Donald Elliot, and John Manning were all clerks on the 
D.C. Circuit. 
 15. See supra note 3. 
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question is when a court ought to hold the use of a nonlegislative rule 
invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act for want of proper 
procedure.16 
This Essay addresses a different question: if informational 
threats are assumed to be unenforceable, when should agencies 
nonetheless use such threats instead of legally binding rules? 
Surprisingly, there is comparatively less attention directed to this 
question. Instead, most of the scholarship suggests an almost reflexive 
distaste for rule by regulatory threat, based on the logic that, in the 
words of Professor Robert Anthony, they “dishonor[] our system of 
limited government,” and can amount to a kind of lawmaking “on the 
cheap or on the sly.”17 
Critics like Professor Anthony argue that the absence of judicial 
review or APA process creates several unattractive possibilities. The 
first is the absence of safeguards like notice, public participation, and 
so on.18 The second is the possibility of an agency exceeding its 
delegated powers or disobeying the direct instructions of Congress.19 
Overall, critics see the use of threats as an endangerment of the 
principle of open government or even as an abuse of power. 
A study of the “ossification” literature gives a sense of the low 
regard in which informal methods are held. A series of works written 
in the 1990s despaired of the fact that tough judicial review was 
leading agencies to abandon rulemaking in favor of adjudication or, 
worst of all, threat regimes.20 Commenting in 1992 on the trend, 
Professor Thomas McGarity wrote, “[N]otice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures provide an element of fairness that is wholly 
lacking when an agency issues a guidance manual and announces that 
 
 16. The classic example of a case that frames the problem this way is Hoctor v. United States 
Department of Agriculture, 82 F.3d 165, 171–72 (7th Cir. 1996), which declared unenforceable an 
informal rule concerning dangerous animals that was issued without notice-and-comment 
procedures. 
 17. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1312, 1379 
(1992). 
 18. Id. at 1372. 
 19. Id. at 1373–74. 
 20. Some of the major works decrying the ossification of rulemaking include McGarity, 
supra note 2; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 59 (1995); and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political 
Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 300. 
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it plans to adhere to it or to some future manifestation of it in future 
enforcement actions.”21 
A more direct critique is Professor Lars Noah’s Administrative 
Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of 
Authority.22 The phrase “arm-twisting” invites a colorful comparison 
between agency officials and unscrupulous professional wrestlers. As 
Professor Noah writes, the practice “saddles parties with more 
onerous regulatory burdens than Congress had authorized, 
accompanied by a diminished opportunity to pursue judicial 
challenges.”23 Professor Phil Weiser, a well-known communications 
scholar, echoes such criticisms in the context of the FCC.24 On the one 
hand, Professor Weiser endorses what he calls “co-regulatory 
strategies.”25 But on the other hand, he distinguishes salutary self-
regulation from threats, which, he warns, “run[] counter to 
democratic legitimacy and transparency values that inhere in official 
agency action.”26 
There are a few dissenters from the scholarly attack on informal 
agency action. Their leader is Professor Peter Strauss, onetime 
general counsel of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
“[I]nterpretative rules, statements of general policy, staff manuals, 
and the like,” writes Professor Strauss, “are an important element in 
the hierarchy of agency law.”27 Interpretative rules, or “publication 
rules,” are, he says, “common and generally salutary forms of 
informal agency action in use well before the Administrative 
Procedure Act was enacted in 1946.”28 Concurring with Professor 
Strauss are Professors Eric Posner and Jacob Gersen, who categorize 
 
 21. McGarity, supra note 2, at 1396. 
 22. Noah, supra note 4. 
 23. Id. at 875. 
 24. See Philip J. Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the 
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 708–11 (2009) (noting the flaws in the FCC’s 
merger review procedures). 
 25. See Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 536 
(2009) (advocating “a model of co-regulation, whereby a private sector collaborative body 
operates under [agency] oversight”). 
 26. Id. at 559. 
 27. Strauss, supra note 3, at 804. 
 28. Id. at 805. 
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agency threats as a form of “soft law” to which the two ascribe some 
useful functions.29 
Apart from Strauss and his fellow travelers, the scholarly 
presumption is that rulemaking or formal adjudication is an 
intrinsically superior process for most agency action. The use of 
threats is considered an abuse of power, a means of avoiding judicial 
review, or perhaps just good old-fashioned laziness. The point of this 
Essay is to challenge that general presumption. Rule by threats, I 
argue, is, under certain circumstances, a superior means of regulatory 
oversight. 
II.  PROVIDING PUBLIC INPUT UNDER CONDITIONS  
OF UNCERTAINTY 
Whether the case is stronger for threats or rulemaking depends 
on the state of industry. Industries can be divided into two states: 
stable and dynamic. In a stable industry, business models are 
relatively settled, and the facts relevant to regulation are therefore 
likely clearer. Conversely, in a dynamic industry, the agency confronts 
what economists call conditions of “high uncertainty.”30 As expressed 
by economist Frank Knight, uncertainty refers to a situation in which 
alternative future states of the world do not occur with quantifiable 
probability.31 More colloquially, many things could happen, and no 
one knows what the odds are that any one thing will occur. 
What creates a dynamic industry is some kind of external shock 
to an existing industry. Examples include disruptive innovation (say, 
the invention of radio broadcasting in the 1920s), unexpected market 
entry (the Japanese entry into electronics in the 1970s), or the rise of 
a new business model (say, pizza delivery). Given such a shock, the 
industry’s business models begin to change, and the future shape or 
function of the industry may be difficult to predict. It is under such 
conditions that threat regimes are more justified and, indeed, 
attractive. 
An agency facing an industry in a state of high uncertainty has 
three choices. First, it can make law—through rulemaking or 
 
 29. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 8, at 626 (ascribing some useful functions to soft law); 
see also Zaring, supra note 2, at 294 (describing and defending the use of “best practices” by 
agencies as a means of regulation). 
 30. See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921) 
(delineating economic risk and economic uncertainty). 
 31. See id. 
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adjudication—to deal with emerging concerns. Second, the agency 
can forgo any action until the industry quiets down and matters 
become clearer. And third, it can watch the growth of the industry 
and issue threats that indicate where it has concerns, and possibly 
which directions it hopes the industry will grow. 
Of the three options, the first—making law—may be the worst 
alternative. What sounds attractive is the prospect of an orderly, 
planned approach to the future. The problem is that, with so little 
known about the industry, issuing specific rules based on guesses 
about the future runs a grave risk of creating a bad law, or at least a 
law that is much worse than one issued after more development. Such 
lawmaking suffers from all of the defects that Friedrich Hayek 
identified with central planning—impressive in a world of perfect 
information, but terrible in this world.32 The history of the FCC is full 
of examples of premature lawmaking. A good example is the 
regulation of the early cable television industries, which were crippled 
by expansive agency rulemaking in their infancy.33 
The irony is that early lawmaking, instead of creating clarity, 
may put the industry in a very unclear position. Given the 
inevitability of a judicial challenge to an important adjudication or 
rulemaking, the industry must try to predict which parts of the rule 
will survive a lengthy judicial review process that may include several 
remands. Further, the industry must predict the outcome of review 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard,34 which is itself capricious 
and arbitrary. This lack of clarity is why, counterintuitively, regulated 
industries may prefer an informal process to the legal paralysis 
common to formal procedures. 
If the law does survive, another problem is that any such law, 
once in place, is likely to remain the regulatory foundation for quite 
some time. In the case of rulemaking under the APA, changing a rule 
requires the same notice-and-comment procedures that attach to the 
 
 32. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945) 
(criticizing centrally planned economies on informational grounds). 
 33. In the 1950s, the FCC issued a series of rules for the cable industry that severely limited 
the industry’s development. The state of the industry in 1970 was captured by Leonard Chazen 
& Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1820, 1820 (1970). For additional history of the regulation of cable television, see Timothy Wu, 
Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 315–21 (2005). 
 34. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006). 
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issuance of a new rule,35 followed by a new opportunity for challenge 
and judicial review. These procedures increase the incentive for an 
agency to let its first rule also be the last rule. Yet, as just explained, 
unless the agency is very lucky, a rule made early in the industry’s 
development is likely to be deeply flawed and potentially crippling. 
The second option—“wait and see”—may sound attractive 
because it allows the industry to develop in what might be called a 
natural way. This approach, however, makes a great sacrifice: the 
public’s interest may be entirely unrepresented during the industry’s 
formative period. The risk is that the industry’s norms and business 
models will, effectively, be set without any public input. Waiting for 
the industry to settle down may result in undesirable practices that 
prove extremely hard to reverse or influence with rules issued later. 
To state the matter more colloquially, the industry may be “baked” 
by the time there is any real oversight or public input. 
As an example, consider the over-the-counter derivatives market 
that developed in the 1990s and 2000s. Many commentators argue 
that waiting, in effect, for the industry to mature before regulating it 
contributed to the financial crisis of 2008.36 In fact, by the 1990s, the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission had begun to think that 
oversight of certain derivatives products might be necessary.37 But 
Congress barred regulation based on industry arguments that, among 
other reasons, the rapidly changing nature of the industry made 
regulation ill-advised.38  
This example aside, there are instances in which “wait and see” 
may be a good approach. First, it may precede a threat regime as facts 
are being gathered. Second, some industries may not need any public 
 
 35. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.412 (2010) (requiring notice-and-comment procedures for most 
FCC rule amendments); see also 49 C.F.R. § 601.22 (2010) (requiring notice-and-comment 
procedures for most Federal Transit Administration rule amendments). 
 36. See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Testimony Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (July 1, 2010), available at http://
www.cftc.gov/pressroom/speechestestimony/opagensler-48.html (suggesting that derivatives 
“played a central role in the 2008 financial crisis,” and urging for greater regulation of 
derivatives markets). 
 37. See Gary Gensler, History of Derivatives Regulation, Culprit OTCs, COMMODITY 
ONLINE (last updated July 2, 2010, 15:35 IST), http://www.commodityonline.com/news/History-
of-derivatives-regulation-culprit-OTCs-29636-2-1.html. 
 38. In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.), Congress urged the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, in the context of its international activities, to be 
mindful that “financial services regulatory policy must be flexible to account for rapidly 
changing derivatives industry business practices.” Id. § 126, 114 Stat. at 2763A-412. 
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input, thanks to an absence of any danger to the public or any serious 
threat of externalities. Consider, for example, the high fashion 
industry, which is a high-uncertainty business, dynamic and ever 
changing, but one in which the case for federal oversight seems weak. 
Finally, the industry might have already developed an effective 
system of self-regulation or best practices. In such a case, the 
government can wait and see whether that system fails or succeeds. A 
classic example of self-regulation is the familiar G, PG, PG-13, R, and 
NC-17 ratings for films—a system that the federal government has 
not sought to supplement with its own censorship regime. 
The third alternative under conditions of uncertainty is to make 
use of some kind of threat. The comparative advantage of a threat 
regime is the following: First, it may bake in the public’s interest and 
opinion during the formative years of an industry without strangling 
the industry with premature rules. Second, without the formality of 
notice and comment, public threats may lead to a useful public debate 
over the industry practice in question. In this case, the very avoidance 
of a legalized procedure may, in fact, facilitate a public debate. A 
threat speaks to the substance of the matter, whereas lawmaking 
often creates a lawyers’ debate over comparatively unintelligible 
issues like subject-matter jurisdiction or standards of review. 
The greatest advantage of a threat regime is its speed and 
flexibility. Unlike a rule, a threat is extant the moment it is made—its 
final shape, so to speak, is immediately apparent. Meanwhile, if all or 
part of the threat regime is perceived as unsuccessful or unnecessary, 
the threat can usually be retracted. Similarly, as a matter of 
democratic accountability, a new administration can change a threat 
regime as soon as it takes power, thereby reflecting, more 
immediately, the will of that administration. 
Threats are not intended as a permanent solution, but rather as 
part of a longer process. If successful and widely respected, it is 
possible that a threat may create an industry norm, removing the 
need for rulemaking at all. Alternatively, a threat regime may be a 
pilot, as it were, for eventual lawmaking. The law created by 
rulemaking or adjudication will then benefit from the facts developed 
under the threat regime. 
Counter to intuition, even if the process specified by the APA is 
meant to protect regulatees, the industry may, at times, prefer 
guidelines or threats. It may, of course, prefer no regulation, or 
hortatory self-regulation most of all. Agencies and industry, facing a 
common challenge of uncertainty, may both prefer to work with an 
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approach that is flexible and avoids litigation that would be expensive 
for both sides. There is a parallel, as Professors Posner and Gersen 
point out, to the use of letters of intent and other “soft” contracts to 
explore the benefits and workability of a given commercial 
relationship.39 By avoiding a harder, lawyerly procedure, both sides 
may benefit. 
Some of what I have described can be seen in the reaction to 
Michael Powell’s 2004 speech.40 The speech set off a lengthy debate 
on the potential dangers of blocking and discrimination by Internet 
carriers—a debate that generated copious academic literature and 
considerable public attention.41 Compared to many of the matters 
handled by the FCC, it cannot be said that public debate was wanting. 
To some degree, Powell’s speech created or reinforced an industry 
norm surrounding Internet blocking and similar behavior. Seven 
years after his speech, and after a change in administration, the FCC 
completed notice-and-comment rulemaking, codifying a rule still 
premised on the original speech, with various elaborations based on 
seven years of debate.42 
Powell’s speech was an example of a public threat. The case for 
the use of private threats is even stronger. Here I have in mind, as a 
model, the use of warning letters by enforcement agencies like the 
Justice Department or Federal Trade Commission in the enforcement 
of various laws, such as consumer protection, fraud, or antitrust. In 
these cases, the uncertainty comes from a different source: the agency 
simply does not know the facts that bear on the enforcement decision. 
The warning letter is a means of factfinding. It may also simply put a 
stop to the activity in question, but in any case, it is a necessary 
prerequisite to formal action. 
The argument that threats sidestep judicial review can be 
overstated. On the one hand, there is no denying that the speed and 
flexibility of a threat regime comes at some cost. Process is expensive 
 
 39. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 8, at 626 (“[N]onenforceable letters of intent . . . set 
the stage for negotiations that will culminate in a binding agreement, [and] nonenforceable 
contracts . . . provide a basis for cooperation but no appeal to the courts. Soft public law has 
similar desirable properties . . . .”). 
 40. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 41. As of March 4, 2011, there were about 2.9 million Google search results for the term 
“Net Neutrality,” and in the Westlaw JLR database, which hosts law reviews, there were 559 
documents featuring the phrases “net neutrality” or “network neutrality.” 
 42. See Preserving The Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 3 
(Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order). 
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and slow, and an advantage of a threat regime lies in avoidance of just 
those costs.43 But it is also critical to remember that a threat, as I have 
described it, is not binding law. In most circumstances, a party 
unhappy with the substance of a threat regime can challenge the 
threat by ignoring it, thus forcing enforcement of some kind and 
opening the threat to judicial review.44 
The early radio industry provides a classic instance of this 
mechanism. Through the 1920s, Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover oversaw the nascent radio industry in a fairly informal 
manner. He encouraged self-regulation of the industry but promoted 
certain codes of conduct and assigned spectrum bands based on an 
implied threat of enforcement. Eventually, by the mid-1920s, the 
broadcast industry grew tired of Hoover’s informal regime. In 1925, 
Zenith Corporation deliberately flouted Hoover’s rules and began 
using frequencies reserved for Canadians, provoking a potential fight 
with the British Empire.45 Hoover ordered it to stop, but Zenith 
refused. A federal district court held that the Radio Act of 1912 had 
not delegated to the Secretary the power to criminalize a 
broadcaster’s failure to adhere to the terms of its license.46 
Zenith’s challenge to Hoover is a classic example of how the 
industry can demand a judicial check on the power of mere threats. It 
is also important to point out that agencies may often reach a point of 
dissatisfaction with mere threats. One reason is that industry 
compliance with a threat may often be partially or entirely 
dissatisfactory. To claim compliance with the threat, for example, an 
industry may create a self-regulatory program that is very weak. 
Second, an agency may want to bind later administrations in a more 
lasting way—and may therefore turn to its power to make law. For 
these and many other reasons, the agency will often have its own 
reasons to turn to formal legal procedures under the APA. 
This is the case for the use of threats. I do not consider the case 
conclusive. As the reader has already noticed, the use of threats relies 
on faith that agencies will be good proxies for the public’s interest. To 
 
 43. Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400 (1973) (advocating the use of economic theory in 
addressing the costs of legal proceedings). 
 44. Cf. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992) 
(describing how judicial review affects an agency’s choice to use more or less formal means of 
regulation). 
 45. HUGH R. SLOTTEN, BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (2000). 
 46. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 618 (N.D. Ill. 1926). 
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be sure, threats can be abused, and are. But that the action can be 
abused does not mean that it lacks merit, if used properly. 
III.  THE ABUSE OF THREATS 
To say that a threat regime is useful in some circumstances is not 
to say it is useful in all circumstances, or that threats cannot 
sometimes be abused. As a general rule, conditions of uncertainty are 
likely the strongest justification for the use of threats. Alternatively, 
the use of informal means as a direct substitute for rules or 
adjudications in settled and mature industries must be viewed with 
some suspicion. 
This point can be well understood from the famous case of 
Hoctor v. United States Department of Agriculture.47 The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture had issued what it considered a mere 
interpretative rule, specifying that fences meant to contain dangerous 
animals must be eight feet tall.48 Judge Richard Posner invalidated an 
enforcement action because the rule had failed to comply with the 
notice-and-comment requirements of the APA.49 As a policy matter, 
there was little justification in that case for not using the notice-and-
comment procedure.50 The big cats—tigers, lions, and hybrids—at 
issue in the case have been a well-known threat to humans for 
thousands of years. Moreover, the agency had previously issued 
notice-and-comment rules for dog and monkey fences.51 Hoctor, 
therefore, is a good example of a case in which the agency had little 
reason to circumvent notice-and-comment procedures. 
Beyond this basic division, several other areas can be identified 
in which threats may constitute an abuse, as opposed to a useful tool. 
The first is when an agency uses threats to take actions that Congress 
has specifically barred, or to accomplish objectives for which it would 
otherwise lack delegated authority. Professor Noah provides a 
number of instances of federal agencies securing from private actors 
“voluntary concessions” beyond what the agencies could seek 
pursuant to their congressionally granted authority.52 
 
 47. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 48. Id. at 168. 
 49. Id. at 171. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Noah, supra note 4, at 876–903. 
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, is 
explicitly barred, “except in extraordinary circumstances,” from 
requiring the preclearance of drug advertising.53 Nonetheless, the 
agency has used the carrot of faster approval procedures to convince 
firms to agree to preclearance that the agency would be banned from 
mandating directly.54 Another area of concern is that agency threats 
may sometimes violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by 
enticing private actors to give up constitutional rights in exchange for 
discretionary benefits.55 
The second area of potential abuse lies in threats issued for 
onetime approvals. An agency often faces a regulated entity that 
needs agency approval for some matter vital to its business, such as 
approval of a merger by the FCC or approval of a drug by the FDA. 
In such onetime approvals, the agency has an enormous potential 
power that may be effectively unreviewable. The reason is that 
approval is such a pressing matter that a prolonged challenge to the 
settlement may be unfeasible. Moreover, because the desired 
approval usually relates to industry settlements that are entirely 
voluntary, it may be unclear exactly what agency action the regulated 
industry is challenging. 
What constitutes abuse in these situations can be a hard 
question. An agency like the FCC or FDA is tasked with general 
duties like the protection of the public interest or public health, and 
the conditions on approval may represent the agency’s sense of its 
statutory duties. In the case of the FCC, the agency is tasked to 
ensure that any transfer of a broadcast license lies in “the public 
interest, convenience and necessity,”56 making imposed conditions the 
execution of congressional will. 
A third area is less a matter of abuse than a matter of 
inappropriateness. Facts may reach a point at which a precise, static 
rule is necessary so that the industry knows exactly what it may and 
may not do. A good example is the body of regulations governing 
passenger safety on airplanes. The industry is stable and has mature 
business models. Airlines need to know exactly which rules they 
should adhere to so as to ensure passenger safety in flight—“move 
your seat back to the upright position” and so on. Threats, guidelines, 
 
 53. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3)(A) (2006). 
 54. Noah, supra note 4, at 931. 
 55. Id. at 913. 
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2006). 
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policy statements, and the like may simply be too hard to find or too 
unclear in such circumstances. 
Professor McGarity writes on this problem in the context of 
trying to identify Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules. 
Here is how he describes one such effort: 
[I]f one writes to EPA and requests a copy of SW-846, EPA will 
send “Final Update I” to the Third Edition of SW-846, which was 
published in November 1990. . . . If the generator makes its request 
very clear, EPA will send Updates I and II of the Second Edition, 
which is legally binding to the extent that specific methods are 
incorporated by reference in the regulations, but superseded by the 
Third Edition for “guidance purposes.” The document that EPA 
sends, however, will contain the following warning: 
Attention 
As noted in the NTIS [National Technical Information Service] 
announcement, portions of this Report are not legible. 
However, it is the best reproduction available from the copy 
sent to NTIS.57 
This example makes obvious a situation in which an informal 
guideline is a poor substitute for a published rule. 
Fourth, in the context of threatened enforcement actions against 
individual firms, the publicity surrounding a threat may constitute the 
punishment itself. This is a power that is easily abused. The news that 
a federal agency is even investigating the regulatee may do as much, if 
not more, damage as any actual fine or punishment. But when the 
facts remain genuinely unknown, the punishment may be 
unwarranted. This is the problem of conviction by press release. 
Although originally a matter of state, not federal, action, the 
famous settlement of many of the world’s largest investment banks 
with several state attorneys general and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission at the beginning of the 2000s can illuminate the coercive 
effects of publicized suspicion. In 2002, then–New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer held a press conference announcing an 
investigation into whether Merrill Lynch was manipulating its 
analytics to make certain stocks look more attractive to potential 
investors. The public threat of prosecution was enough to incite 
Merrill Lynch to settle—without, of course, admitting any 
wrongdoing. Ultimately, as the investigation expanded to other firms, 
 
 57. McGarity, supra note 2, at 1394–95 (second alteration in original). 
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the banks involved agreed to pay “a total of about $1.4 billion in fines 
and other penalties.”58 
Conviction by press release requires an enormous certainty on 
the part of the agency that it is actually correct about the misbehavior 
in question. Thus, it can be preferable not to publicize warnings or 
investigations unless the party reveals the investigation, or the agency 
takes formal action. 
CONCLUSION 
In The Godfather,59 Don Vito Corleone pursued most of his 
regulatory goals using threats. Some were delivered in formats that 
would be considered unusual by administrative law standards but did 
not want for clarity. Don Corleone resorted to actual enforcement 
actions only when absolutely necessary and did not seem to make use 
of notice-and-comment procedures.60 
The comparison shows why threats have a bad name, suggesting 
why agencies prefer terms like “guidelines” or “interpretative rules.” 
Nonetheless, whatever the nomenclature, I believe that regulatory 
threats are an important tool for agencies dealing with certain types 
of problems. As opposed to always trying to encourage the use of 
lawmaking procedures, agency watchers and scholars should instead 
argue that the power to make threats ought to be used responsibly. 
This Essay has proposed a few guidelines toward that end. 
 
 
 58. Adi Ignatius, Wall Street’s Top Cop, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 64, 70. 
 59. THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 1972). 
 60. Id. 
